Introduction
The biggest driver of public debt increases is not primary deficits, nor output, nor interest payments. Instead, the main driver is large stock flow adjustments (SFAs), the residual term in a traditional debt decomposition exercise (Jalles, Jaramillo, Mulas-Granados, 2017).
These SFAs can be considered as blind spots in public debt dynamics because they cannot be properly modelled or accurately forecasted (Jaramillo, Kimani and Mulas-Granados, 2017).
Moreover, they are typically associated with a lack of transparency in fiscal accounts (Weber, 2012 ).
Many public finance scholars have explored the drivers of debt increases, but the analysis of SFAs in debt dynamics and the relationship between them and fiscal frameworks and institutions, within a fiscal reaction function framework, has received little attention. This is a particularly relevant policy question since fiscal frameworks and institutions -which are meant at constraining the behaviour of governments 1 -can lead to creative accounting to circumvent such aspects (Milesi-Ferretti, 2003) .
Among the initial papers that have studied the role of SFAs on public debt accumulation, the most comprehensive article is the one by Campos, Jaimovich and Panizza (2006), who assembled a dataset of debt spikes in 117 countries for the period 1972 to 2003. They concluded that debt spikes have little to do with budget deficits, but instead arise from stock flow adjustments, which can be partly explained by contingent liabilities and balance sheet effects.
However, they noted that these two components only explain 20 percent of the intra-country variance of SFA, and concluded that there is still much that we do not understand about SFA.
In addition, Abbas et al. (2011) looked at 60 episodes of debt increases between 1880-2007 and found that key contributors to public debt surges during non-recessionary periods were both primary deficits and stock-flow adjustments. Finally, Weber (2012), using data for 163 countries between 1980 and 2010, showed that stock-flow adjustments were a significant source of debt increases, while they played only a minor role in explaining debt decreases. SFAs could only be partly explained by balance sheet effects and the realization of contingent liabilities, and significant differences existed in average stock-flow adjustments across countries reflecting country-specific factors. Weber concluded that fiscal transparency has a major role to play in this area since fiscally transparent countries tend to have a smaller magnitude of SFA in their debt increases. largely focused on advanced economies or a sample of European countries, we extend the coverage to include also emerging and low-income countries, an aspect previously unexplored.
In addition to inspecting the role of fiscal rules in affecting SFAs, we go deeper in the analysis by looking at different types and design characteristics of those rules. Furthermore, for a subsample of countries, we rely on a recent dataset on fiscal institutions (Gupta and Ylautinen, 2014 ) and inspect which matter the most for the build-up of SFAs.
Our main findings are: i) SFAs contribute to the change in the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio with a coefficient close to one. ii) Fiscal rules in general did not led governments to a systematic use SFAs to lower deficits in our country sample. iii) Countries with some form of macro-fiscal forecasting tool in place have allowed governments to use SFAs to lower deficit.
iv) The existence of fiscal rules in which monitor compliance exist, contributes to lower the debt level, although the cyclical deficit partly counteracts this desirable effect. v) The magnitude of the fall in the debt ratio due to the presence of fiscal rules before the crisis was between 1.7-4.2 percent of GDP. vi) After the Global and Financial Crisis (GFC), revenue and debt-based rules contributed positively to the accumulation of debt, a fact that is reinforced via large SFAs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the key accounting identity on the decomposition of government debt changes. Section 3 provides details on the empirical methodology and data. Section 4 discusses the main empirical results.
Section 5 concludes.
Accounting Identity
The standard equation for decomposing debt changes (see Escolano, 2010 for further details) can be mathematically represented as follows:
Equation (1) states that the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio ( − ) between time 0 and time T, is the sum of three components: (i) the product of the lagged debt ratio ( ) and the difference between the nominal effective interest rate on debt ( ) and the nominal GDP growth rate ( ), cumulated over the years under scrutiny; (ii) the cumulative government deficit to GDP ( ); and (iii) a cumulative stock-flow adjustment ( ) or debt-deficit adjustment term which captures valuation effects and "below-the-line" fiscal-financial operations (for example financial sector recapitalization, or privatizations receipts or the impact of exchange rate changes on foreign denominated debt), as well as errors and omissions. 2 In von Hagen and Wolff's (2006) simpler notation, we have:
A positive SFA means that the stock of government debt has risen between period t and (t-1) by more than the budget deficit recorded in period t. Typical official definitions tend to treat SFA as a statistical residual, which should cancel out over time. However, "large and persistent stock-flow adjustments (especially if they always have a negative impact on debt developments) should give cause for concern, as they may be the result of the inappropriate recording of budgetary operations and can lead to large ex-post upward revisions in deficit levels" (EC, 2003, pp. 79).
Empirical Methodology and Data

Empirical Approach
According to Milesi-Ferretti´s (2003) fiscal rules (and to our larger purposes, fiscal frameworks and institutions) may induce governments to engage in "bad" or even "ugly" creative accounting. To empirically test this proposition, we study the relation between deficits and SFAs in a large panel of countries between 1985-2014. 2 This debt decomposition measures only the direct effect of real GDP on the denominator of the debt to GDP ratio. It does not, however, measure the indirect effects of real GDP growth on other subcomponents (such as the primary balance and SFA), which could be significant. For example, Bova et al. (2016) find that realizations of contingent liabilities (often reflected in SFA) tend to occur during periods of economic stress.
Looking at equation (2) above, the change of the public debt level in percent of GDP in country i at time t (∆ = ( − )/ ) is the sum of SFA in percent of GDP ( ) and the deficit in percent of GDP ( ). If one takes the following equation:
Then is algebraically given by: = 1 +
Assuming that = 1 implies that the covariance between deficits and SFAs is zero. A coefficient smaller (larger) than one implies a negative (positive) covariance between and . Borrowing from von Hagen and Wolff (2996), the following reduced-form regression equation will be used to empirically estimate the impact of fiscal frameworks and institutions:
where is our fiscal framework or institution proxy, are country fixed effects to account for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity and is a disturbance term satisfying standard conditions of zero mean and constant variance. If the hypothesis of no relation between and holds true and = 1, the coefficient measures directly the covariance between deficits and SFAs when a given fiscal framework or institution is in place. If < 0 then an increase in the SFA would lower the deficit.
To separate the effects of structural from cyclically adjusted deficits, we run an alternative regression equation, given by:
The treatment effect of can be identified by the coefficient . A negative value of this coefficient means that an increase in deficits leads to a lower SFA as a consequence of the presence of a given . Coefficients and should have the same sign as they reflect the same covariance. To uncover the effect of the structural and cyclical part of the deficit, equation (5) is augmented as follows: 3 We equally tried estimating the key equations with a difference GMM estimator but decided against it because the lagged dependent variable was not significant. Moreover, the tenor of the results is very similar to the system GMM. More specifically, we run the two-step system-GMM estimator with Windmeijer standard errors. The significance of the results is robust to different choices of instruments and predetermined variables. 4 As far as information on the choice of lagged levels (differences) used as instruments in the difference (level) equation, as work by Bowsher (2002) and, more recently, Roodman (2009) have indicated, when it comes to moment conditions (as thus to instruments) more is not always better. The GMM estimators are likely to suffer from "overfitting bias" once the number of instruments approaches (or exceeds) the number of groups/countries (as a simple rule of thumb). In the present case, the validity of instruments was examined using Sargan's test of overidentifying restrictions. Intuitively, the system GMM estimator does not rely exclusively on the firstdifferenced equations, but exploits also information contained in the original equations in levels. 5 Kiviet (1995) used asymptotic expansion techniques to approximate the small sample bias of the standard LSDV estimator for samples where N is small or only moderately large. Bruno (2005) extended the bias approximation formulas to accommodate unbalanced panels with a strictly exogenous selection rule.
Data and Stylized Facts
Our sample, for which the macro data come from the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, covers 65 countries observed over the period 1985-2014. We also rely on IMF´s WEO measures of the cyclically adjusted balance (deficit) and use it to construct the structural component and the difference with the unadjusted balance (deficit).
We use equation (2) percentage points of GDP more debt than their budget data suggest, respectively. SFAs are negative mainly in Eastern European Countries.
[ Figure 1 ]
In addition, Figure 2 exemplifies the accounting identity for some countries, on a yearly basis, where we show the specific relevance and magnitude of the stock flow adjustment, which tend to be rather persistent over time in many cases, therefore blurring to some extent the link between (primary) budget balances and government debt dynamics.
[ Figure In the analysis, we include 65 countries, which had at least one of the rules in place during the period of analysis. Overall, during the 31 years of the timespan at least one rule in place was observed in 1076 cases (on 2015 possible), the most frequent being the budget balance rule (974 cases), followed by debt rule (772 occurrences), expenditure rule (399), the least frequent being the revenue rule (186). Only a handful of countries (Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore) had at least one rule in place for the entire time span. In all of these cases, it was the balanced budget rule, additionally completed by an expenditure rule (for Germany) and debt rule (in Malaysia). If a given rule was in place, the debt rule was present in a given country for almost 16.5 years, balanced budget rule for 15.7 years, revenue rule for 13.3 years (but it was present only in 13 countries) and expenditure rule for 9.7 years. The dataset additionally contains information about monitoring, enforcement and escape clause for each type of rules. We use this data on somewhat more aggregate level, i.e., if any of the fiscal rules applied in a country had a monitoring of compliance in place, the variable FR_monitor assumes value 1 and zero otherwise. The same is the case for formal enforcement procedure and escape clauses whereas independent monitoring body and transparency are taken "as they are" from the IMF database. 6 As far as fiscal rules are concerned we can plot the absolute number of new rules (of any type) over time by income group, and we get the pattern observed in Figure 3 . Looking at Advanced Economies, while countries have implemented fiscal rules since the mid-1980s, most of them followed the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (in adherence to the EU convergence criteria)
as well as after the Global Financial Crisis. In non Advanced Economies, the absolute number of fiscal rules is lower than the advanced economies sample, and most of them were implemented starting in the early 2000s.
[ Figure 3 ]
Gupta and Yläoutinen (2014) made available another dataset on fiscal rules, which we also use. They analyse fiscal institutional frameworks in G-20 economies complemented by six lowincome countries (Kenya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Uganda, Vietnam and Zambia). In particular, aspects covered in this database include: fiscal reporting (fr), macro fiscal forecasting (mf), independent fiscal agency (ifa), fiscal objectives (fo), medium term budget framework 6 The most frequent and relatively persistent design feature is the existence of an enforcement mechanism, which was in place in 28 countries on average for slightly more than 10 years. Marginally least popular is monitoring (25 countries, on average in place for 9.6 years), Transparency requirements were present in 21 countries, notably on average for the longest period, i.e. for almost 11 years. Independent monitoring body was in place in 22 countries, but as a relatively recent mechanism, its average duration only slightly exceeds 5 years. Finally, some form of escape clause is present in 12 countries, on average for 7.5 years.
(mbf), budget execution (be), understanding the scale and scope of the fiscal challenge (understanding), developing a credible fiscal strategy (developing) and implementing the fiscal strategy through the budget process (implementing). Except for ifa, which is present only in 17 out of the 26 countries, all of these institutions are to a smaller or larger extent present in at least 24 countries. 7 
Empirical Results
Baseline with Fiscal Rules
We start by estimating equations 4 and 5 for the different fiscal rules proxies using the entire sample of countries and time span. Results are displayed in Tables 1 and 2 respectively.
Starting with Table 1 , we observe that SFAs, as the accounting identity suggests, contribute to the change in the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio with a coefficient close to one. The existence of a fiscal rule leads of a fall in the debt level but the coefficient estimate is not statistically different from zero (specification 1). Since the coefficient on the SFA is not statistically different from one, the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms represent the covariances between the SFA and the deficit when a specific rule or a rule with a certain characteristic is in place. In the cases of the rules FRmonitor, indepmonit and transp the interaction term comes out positive but with a small magnitude and statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Contrary to the evidence presented in von Hagen and Wolff (2006) -who used a different definition for the fiscal rule dummy variable, closer to an event study approach, for a smaller country group -these findings suggest that fiscal rules in general did not led governments to systematically use SFAs to lower deficits in our sample of 65 countries. Moreover, in Table 2 we still have that fiscal rules do not statistically significantly affect the change in the debt level.
As in Table 1 [ Table 1] [ Table 2] 7 Descriptive statistics are presented in the Appendix.
Baseline with Fiscal Institutions
In Table 3 we re-estimate equations 4 and 5 using the smaller sample stemming from [ Table 3 A similar conclusion is also true with regard to the debt rule, but in this case, the impact of both deficit components is similarly positive. Finally, the existence of fiscal rules in which monitor compliance exist, contributes to lower the debt level, but the cyclical deficit partly counteracts this desirable effect.
[ Table 4 ]
Country Sample and Time Split
As a first sensitivity exercise, we split our large heterogeneous sample between OECD and non-OECD countries. We observe in Table 5 -estimating equation 4 -that SFAs seem to be more important in positively changing the debt level in non-OECD countries (where the coefficient estimates and closer to 1 vis-à-vis the OECD). In addition, we see that in the OECD sub-sample the existence of debt rules lead of a rise in the debt level, an effect that is exacerbated when coupled with SFAs.
In addition, in Table 6 in turn, we split the period before and after the Global Financial Crisis (in 2018). The crisis was indeed a major structural break in the sense that before, most fiscal rules seem to lower debt levels and had a clear actively constraining role in keeping government debt from rising. The order of magnitude of the fall in the debt level due to the presence of fiscal rules before the crisis was between 1.7-4.2 percent of GDP. After the crisis, both revenue-based and debt-based rules starting contributing positively to the accumulation of debt, a fact that is reinforced with the existence of large SFAs.
[ Table 5 ]
[ Table 6 ]
Other Robustness Exercises
Our final exercise relates to stress-testing our previous results to alternative estimators.
In particular, we run a pooled OLS, a within fixed effects estimator and the bias corrected least squares dummy variable. Results in Table 7 confirm the relevance of SFAs for the change in government debt. Without accounting for potential endogeneity, we get the nice result that the simple existence of fiscal rules lowers the public debt level (specifications 1, 4, 7). In addition, as before, both components of the deficit positively affect public debt, with the positive effect of the structural component being reinforced when fiscal rules are present.
[ Table 7 ]
In addition to the robustness check to alternative estimators, we also employed an alternative method to extract the structural and cyclical components of the budget deficit. In particular, instead of relying on the IMF's WEO measure of output gap, we rather apply the recent filtering technique developed by Hamilton (2017) . Once the output gap is obtained, we then used it to get a new measure of the cyclically adjusted balance. Reflecting the fact that the elasticity of government revenues (REV) to output growth is close to one while expenditure (EXP) is largely inelastic to growth (Girouard and André, 2005), we multiply government revenues by the factor [1/(1+OG/100)] to get REV_adj (revenue adjusted), with OG being the output gap obtain via the Hamilton filter. Then CAB=REV_adj -EXP.
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The results from re-estimating equation 6 with system GMM and the new structural and cyclical deficit variables (and interaction terms) are not qualitatively different from the ones previously discussed (available upon request).
Conclusion and Policy Implications
We have assessed how SFA contribute to the path of the debt-to-GDP ratio in a panel of 65 countries in the period 1985-2014. Therefore, and vis-à-vis previous related literature, we extend the coverage beyond developed economies to include also emerging and low-income countries, an aspect previously unexplored. In addition to inspecting the role of fiscal rules in affecting SFAs, we go deeper in the analysis by looking at different types and design characteristics of those rules. Furthermore, for a subsample of countries, we also rely on a recent dataset on fiscal institutions and examine which matter the most for the build-up of SFAs.
Our main results are the following: i) SFAs contribute to the change in the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio with a coefficient close to one. ii) Fiscal rules in general did not led governments to a systematic use SFAs to lower deficits in our country sample. iii) Countries with some form of macro-fiscal forecasting tool in place have allowed governments to use SFAs to lower deficit. iv) The existence of fiscal rules in which monitor compliance exist, contributes to lower the debt level, although the cyclical deficit partly counteracts this desirable effect. v)
The magnitude of the fall in the debt ratio due to the presence of fiscal rules before the crisis was between 1.7-4.2 percent of GDP. vi) After the GFC, both revenue-based and debt-based rules starting contributing positively to the accumulation of debt, a fact that is reinforced with the presence of large SFAs.
Our results have a number of policy implications. First, it is important to notice the effect of the GFC in reversing, to some extent, the performance of the fiscal rules in curbing government debt developments. Hence, policy makers would need to integrate this result in the implementation and redefinition of such fiscal frameworks. Second, the fact that in some cases countries used the SFA with an impact on the development of general government debt, raises 
Figure 2. Accounting identity (% of GDP)
Note: "sfa" denotes stock flow adjustments; "deficit" denotes the budget deficit; "bt-bt-1" denotes the change in the public debt level. Source: authors' calculations. Note: Dependent variable is the change in debt in percent of GDP.Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. "FR_1" if a country has at least one fiscal rule; "ER" = expenditure rule in place; "RR" revenue rule in place; "DR" = debt rule in place; "BBR" = budget balance rule in place, "monitor" = at least one of the rules in place monitor compliance exist; "enforce" = at least one of the rules in place formal enforcement procedure exist; "escape" at least of the rules in place escape clause exist. "Independent_monitor" = an independent body monitors implementation of the rules. "transparency" = Fiscal Responsibility Laws are in place ensuring transparency and accountability. Fiscal rules dataset from Lledó et al (2017) . Note: Dependent variable is the change in debt in percent of GDP. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. "FR_1" if a country has at least one fiscal rule; "ER" = expenditure rule in place; "RR" revenue rule in place; "DR" = debt rule in place; "BBR" = budget balance rule in place, "monitor" = at least one of the rules in place monitor compliance exist; "enforce" = at least one of the rules in place formal enforcement procedure exist; "escape" at least of the rules in place escape clause exist. "Independent_monitor" = an independent body monitors implementation of the rules. "transparency" = Fiscal Responsibility Laws are in place ensuring transparency and accountability. Fiscal rules dataset from Lledó et al (2017) . Note: Dependent variable is the change in debt in percent of GDP. LDV denotes lagged dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. "fr"=fiscal reporting; "mf"=macro fiscal forecasting; "IFA"=independent fiscal agency; "fo" fiscal objectives; "MBF" medium term budget framework; "be" budget execution; "understanding"=understanding the scale and scope of the fiscal challenge; "developing" = developing a credible fiscal strategy; "implementing" = implementing the fiscal strategy through the budget process. Fiscal rules dataset from Gupta and Yloutinen (2014). Note: Dependent variable is the change in debt in percent of GDP. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. "FR_1" if a country has at least one fiscal rule; "ER" = expenditure rule in place; "RR" revenue rule in place; "DR" = debt rule in place; "BBR" = budget balance rule in place, "monitor" = at least one of the rules in place monitor compliance exist; "enforce" = at least one of the rules in place formal enforcement procedure exist; "escape" at least of the rules in place escape clause exist. "Independent_monitor" = an independent body monitors implementation of the rules. "transparency" = Fiscal Responsibility Laws are in place ensuring transparency and accountability. Fiscal rules dataset from Lledó et al (2017) . Note: Dependent variable is the change in debt in percent of GDP. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. "FR_1" if a country has at least one fiscal rule; "ER" = expenditure rule in place; "RR" revenue rule in place; "DR" = debt rule in place; "BBR" = budget balance rule in place. Fiscal rules dataset from Lledó et al (2017) . Note: Dependent variable is the change in debt in percent of GDP. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. "FR_1" if a country has at least one fiscal rule; "ER" = expenditure rule in place; "RR" revenue rule in place; "DR" = debt rule in place; "BBR" = budget balance rule in place. Fiscal rules dataset from Lledó et al (2017) . Note: Dependent variable is the change in debt in percent of GDP. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. Specifications 4-6 include country and time fixed effects omitted for reasons of patrimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. "FR_1" if a country has at least one fiscal rule; "ER" = expenditure rule in place; "RR" revenue rule in place; "DR" = debt rule in place; "BBR" = budget balance rule in place. Fiscal rules dataset from Lledó et al (2017) . 
APPENDIX
EconPol Europe
EconPol Europe -The European Network for Economic and Fiscal Policy Research is a unique collaboration of policy-oriented university and nonuniversity research institutes that will contribute their scientific expertise to the discussion of the future design of the European Union. In spring 2017, the network was founded by the ifo Institute together with eight other renowned European research institutes as a new voice for research in Europe.
The mission of EconPol Europe is to contribute its research findings to help solve the pressing economic and fiscal policy issues facing the European Union, and thus to anchor more deeply the European idea in the member states. Its tasks consist of joint interdisciplinary research in the following areas 1) sustainable growth and 'best practice', 2) reform of EU policies and the EU budget,
3) capital markets and the regulation of the financial sector and 4) governance and macroeconomic policy in the European Monetary Union.
Its task is also to transfer its research results to the relevant target groups in government, business and research as well as to the general public.
